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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 15714 
-vs-
BERNARD SANDOVAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged ¥ith the crime of aggravated 
robbery, in violation of § 76-6-302, Utah Criminal Code. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant and two co-defendants were tried jointly 
on January 12-13, 1978, before a jury in the Third District 
lD'J:-t of 03.l t ~a:::: Co'_::-,ty·. T;1e Court belmv denied appellant's 
motion for severance and/or mistrial and subsequently denied 
his motion for a new trial. Appellant and co-defendants were 
all found guilty of the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony 
of the first degree. 
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l\_ppellant vras sentenced to a terrn of five years 
life but was granted a stay of sentence and placed on · probJ+ , 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL I 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of~ 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant and co-defendants Carter and Morishiu 
were charged with having committed the crime of aggravated 
robbery on or about the 31st day of March, 1977. (R. p. 11) 
On January 12, 1978, appellant and co-defendants were joint!~ 
brought to trial before a jury in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County. 
After respondent rested its case, appellant's coun;,i 
I 
did not call appellant to the stand, but rested his case 
without exercising appellant's right to testify. 
I 
Counsel for co-defendant Morishita then stated 
during his opening statement that he would call appellant to 
the stand to testify (R. p. 337). Counsel for appellant 
obj2c:ted c.~r:- t:-ie court sustained t::e objRction.. IJ'hP r•nilft 
tn' p n ad·~ on l. <:h -a J_, . t-o a" i' s re•:J c~r.--1 -t-n' p r;-,~_ tter, s ca tir.y t: .. ~" '"' " _, c c.n•.o Jury _ __ _, ~ - _ "'-' 
a defendant could not be called to the stand involuntarily. 
(R. p. 437). 
-2-
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A conference was subsequently held at the side bar 
during 1,1hich the court informed counsel for co-defendant 
Morishita that he could not call appellant Sandoval to the 
stand to testify. Appellant's counsel at this time also 
st.ute~l tho.t appello.nt r.,;oulQ no~ cake the stand. (R. p. 203) 
After counsel for co-defendant Morishita completed 
his opening statement, the court directed him to call his 
f~st witness. At that time, counsel for Morishita called 
appellant Sandoval to the stand. (R. p. 337). Counsel for 
appellant objected and the objection was sustained by the 
court. 
Counsel for appellant then moved for a severance 
and/or mistrial and his motion was denied. (R. p. 337). 
Subsequent to the trial, counsel for appellant filed 
a motion for a new trial (R. p. 158), which motion was denied 
by the court. (R. p. 166). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
~~E TRIAL coon~ DID NOT ERR NOR 
.. ~=~:-~-~ ~:is ~I8 1~~~-~-T'I()~-: I;-- iJ£i\YI7'·:c.: 
!:.:'?~'.i~L_=').:;T 1 s LO~ roi:; F02 . .3Ei/LRi~.N(~E 
AND/Oa MISTRIAL. 
Appellant contends that the trial court should 
have granted his motion for severance and/or mistrial on the 
-3-
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grounds that appellant was prejudiced by the conduct of 
counsel for co-defendant Morishita. 
Al though appellant concedes that the announcenent 
by counsel for co-defendant Morishita of his intention ~ 
call appellant to the stand was most likely in3u[ficient ~ 
prejudice the jury, he claims that the subsequent actual 
calling of appellant by counsel for Morishita focused ilie 
attention of the jury on appellant's failure to testify in 
the same manner as if direct comment had been made. 
In support of his contention, appellant cites the 
case of Deluna v. United States, 308 F. 2d 140 (5th Cir. 1%i 
reh. denied 324 F. 2d 375 (1963), which can be distinguished 
from the case at bar. In Deluna, the comments made by the 
co-defendant's attorney were several and included contr~t~ 
his client's willingness to take the stand with the co-
defendant' s unwillingness to do so. The trial judge in~ 
made matters worse with an instruction that admonished the 
jury to not disregard the testimony of the co-defendant whic' 
had the effect of incriminating the other co-defendant who 
had faile1 ta testi~y. 
The nature of the prejudicial comments in ~ 
differs significantly from the statement made in the instant; 
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case. Subsequent cases have distinguished Delun~ and held 
thi.lt comments on the defendant's failure to testify are not 
always reversible error. Certainly the inference to be 
drawn from a comment on the defendant's failure to testify 
is ~Jl!Lstar.tially s c:::onger than the in£er2ncc which Flight b2 
drawn from simply calling defendant to the stand; yet the 
courts have determined that even comments made in certain 
instances are not prejudicial error. 
In United States v. Alpern, 564 F. 2d 755 (7th Cir. 
1977), citing the case of United States v. Hutul, 416 F. 2d 
607 (7th Cir. 19 69) , the court distinguished Deluna and held 
that counsel's comrnent created no reversible error. In 
Alpern, as in Hutul, the court said that counsel's comment on 
defendant's failure to take the stand was but an: 
isolated and oblique reference 
to his co-defendant's failure to take the 
stand having no prejudicial effect that 
could not be curved by the cautionary 
instructions given in this case." Id. at 761. 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has distinguished its 
decision in Deluna, limiting Deluna to its facts, i.e., to 
theories o::= defense. Other jurisdictions have taken the 
same view of D=luna's precedential value. E.q. UnitPn 
S~tes v. Hine~, 455 F. -2d 1317 (U.S. App. D.C. 1972) cert denied, 
-5-
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406 U.S. 969; United States v. Shuford, 454 F. 2d 772 
(4th Cir. 1971). Further, the Fifth Circuit distingui~~ 
Deluna in the case of United States v. Washington, 550 F.~ 
320 (5th Cir. 1977) where, unlike Deluna, coITLments regardir 
defendant's failure to testify were made merely in th 2 
summation of facts and no reversible error was found. 
In a still more recent case, United States v. 
572 F. 2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit distingc' 
Deluna on the basis that comment made by the co-defendant i:. 
argument regarding defendant's failure to testify was (1) 
isolated and ( 2) not the result of any conduct on the part 
of the prosecution and (3) that the court instruction to th' 
jury cured any error. 
At the trial of the present case, no comment was 
made on appellant's failure to testify. Appellant was simpl 
called to the stand and exercising his privilege, chose to 
remain silent. No comment on appellant's failure to testif1 
was made in the presence of the jury. 
Section 77-31-6, u.c.A. (1953 as amended) provides 
fo~ a joint trial o~ t~o or more defendants c~arg0~ wici1 ~· 
same offense unless the trial court uses its discretion to ' 
sever. On review, the general test for error turns upoo 
whether or not the record of the case at hand reflects an 
., 
abuse of that discretion. 
urah I See State v. Rivenburgh, 11 ° i 
I 
2d 95, 355 P. 2d 689, 698 (1960); State v. Lybert, 30 Utah 
-6-
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l80 515 P. 2c1 441, '142 (1973); and Statr:= v. Gaxiola, 550 
P. 2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
This Court in State v. Gaxiola, 550 P. 2d 1298 
(Utah 1976), upheld the trial court's denial of co-defendant's 
antagonistic defense. In Gaxiola, co-defendants were jointly 
prosecuted for murder. This Court said: 
"Since a demand for severance is not 
a matter of right, it must appear the 
trial court had before it facts which 
would indicate defendant would be unduly 
prejudiced before this court can hold that 
there had been an abuse of discretion." 
Id. at 1301. 
Section 77-42-1 U.C.A (1953 as amended) requires that 
errors which do not affect substantial rights of the parties 
be disregarded. See State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 
P. 2d 639 (1970). In the event error has been corrmi.itted, it 
is not presumed to have resulted in prejudice and the Court 
must be satisfied the error had a prejudicial effect before 
it is warranted in reversing the judgment. 
This court in State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 
1.: Hodges, the prose>c'..l~ing attor:;.ey inquired as to whether 
~e defendant, on trial for robbery and assault with a deadly 
weapon, had used the same gun to perpetrate another robbery. 
-7-
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The court sustained defendant's counsel's objection but 
denied his motion for severance, and admonished the jury ~r 
base its verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial. 
In support of its decision not to reverse, this Courts~~ 
. there should be no reversal of 
a conviction merely because of error or 
irregularity, but only if it is substantial 
and prejudicial in the sense that in its 
absence there is a reasonable likelihood 
that there would have been a different 
result." (Emphases added) Id. at 1325. 
Thus, according to Gaxiola, absent a showing of 
actual prejudice to appellant and absent a showing of a 
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a differe~'. 
result, Hodges, the trial court's denial of appellant's 
motion for severance and/or mistrial should be upheld by 
this Court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR NOR 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
I 
I 
I 
Appellant filed a motion for new trial on the grou:j 
I 
cal2.€:d '!:o -:.esti. 
Appellant cites U.C.A. 77-44-5 (1953) which state:i 
that a defendant's failure or refusal to testify "shall not 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in any manner prejudice him or be used against him on the 
trial or proceeding." 
In the instant case, appellant was not prejudiced 
by his exercise of his right to silence. There was no 
co:"..--:-,en.:: 11ccE-= tJ the eff2ct that he~ fai~cd to co:n..e forth a.:h ... 1 
testify. lvhether he was cal led by co-defendant or a prosecutor 
and refused to take the stand creates no more prejudice 
towards him than if he were to sit there in silence. In 
either instance the jurors are aware of the fact that he 
has not testified. The jurors in this case were admonished by 
the trial court that a defendant could not be called to the 
stand involuntarily and that his failure to testify is not 
an admission of guilt nor can it be used against him. 
As appellant points out, this Court in State v. 
Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639 (1970), adopted the 
position that ~hen a fundamental constitutional right has been 
abused or denied, any error pertaining thereto is presumed 
to be prejudicial. However, this Court went on to state 
lliat the error is not prejudicial per se since there are 
right could have no possible bearing on any unfairn2ss or 
~position upon the defendant or upon a correct determination 
of his guilt or innocence. 
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For example, in the case of United States v. 
Sigal, 572 F. 2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1978) the court concluded 
that certain comments made by the prosecution, taken on 
face value as the court assumed the jury would take them, 
constituted a comElent on defend.ant's failure to testi~y a": 
thus was an error of constitutional dimension. However, 
citing Chapman v. California, the Court stated that automatic 
reversal does not result if the error can be said to have be' 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court decided t~ 
by applying the test set forth in Anderson v. Nelson, wherei:. 
the court said that such a comment was reversible error wher. 
"such comment is extensive, where an inference of guilt fro: 
silence is stressed to the jury as a basis of conviction, 
and where there is evidence that could have been supported 
acquittal." The court in Sigal determined the error to be 
harmless and stated: 
"Here the comment was not extensive, 
there was minimal stress on any inference 
of guilt to be drawn by the jury from 
the silence, and there was no substantial 
evidence which supported an acquittal." 
Id. at 1323. 
Thus, as tD.e colL:Ct in Sic;o.l c.~rnunst.ra ted, even 
error determined to be of constitutional significance a~ 
so presumably prejudicial can be harmless error and not 
prejudicial as appellant contends. 
-10-
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As illustrated in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 
202, 468 P. 2d 639 (1970), this presurnption can be overcome 
when the court is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" 
that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the proceedings. 
"Correlative to this it is also 
true that when the guilt is shown by 
other untainted evidence so over-
whelming that there is no likelihood 
whatsoever of a different result in 
the absence of such error or ir-
regularity, there should be no re-
versal." Id. at p. 643 (Emphasis added) 
Respondent submits that this is the case here. 
Absent the likelihood of a different result had the appellant 
oot been called by counsel for Morishita, the ruling of 
the trial court denying appellant's motion for a new trial 
should be upheld. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
FUNDAI1ENTAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY IN THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT ADMONISHED THE 
JURY TO DISREGARD THE ACTIONS OF 
CO'"iS?:S FO? l'O?.IS'1IT1\ IN CALLHFC: 
Appellant claims that the tridl court's failure to 
9Unt his motions for severance or a new trial deprived 
him of a fundamental constitutional right--the right to be 
-11-
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tried before an impartial jury. Appellant claims that the 
inferences to be drawn from his refusal to take the s~~ 
after being called by counsel for co-defendcrnt Morishita 
prejudiced the jury as to appellant. 
Appellant cites State v. Scandrett, 24 Ui:ah 2u 2o;, 
468 P. 2d 639 (1970) decided by this Court, as setting forth 
the standard of review for an alleged violation of a 
fundamental constitutional right. In Scandrett, this Court 
stated that there is a presumption that error violating a 
constitutional right is prejudicial but further stated that 
such presumption can be overcome when the court is convinced 
beyond reasonable doubt that the error had no such prejudici; 
effect upon the proceedings. 
Appellant was not denied a trial by an imparti~ 
jury. Even if respondent were to concede that the calling o' 
I 
appellant to the stand by counsel for co-defendant Morishit1 I 
was improper, the court prevented any prejudice to the appell' 
arising out of that incident by admonishing the jury to 
disregard it. 
this court stated that there is not reversible error if 
comment is made regarding the failure of an accused to tesfr 
so long as the court admonishes the jury to disregard t~ 
same. Here we do not have comments but merely the callino 
-12-
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appellant to the stand. The court admonished the jury to 
disregard the same and the appellant was not prejudiced 
thereby. 
In the case at bar, appellant was tried by a fair 
error during the proceedings, appellant suffered no deprivation 
or denial of a fundamental constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectully submits that in view of the 
arguments presented above, the appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-13-
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